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Abstract
. Improving performance of primary care systems in low- andBackground
middle-income countries (LMICs) may be a necessary condition for
achievement of universal health coverage in the age of Sustainable
Development Goals. The Salud Mesoamerica Initiative (SMI), a large-scale,
multi-country program that uses supply-side financial incentives directed at the
central-level of governments, and continuous, external evaluation of public,
health sector performance to induce improvements in primary care
performance in eight LMICs. This study protocol seeks to explain whether and
how these interventions generate program effects in El Salvador and
Honduras.
. This study presents the protocol for a study that uses a realistMethods
evaluation approach to develop a preliminary program theory that hypothesizes
the interactions between context, interventions and the mechanisms that trigger
outcomes. The program theory was completed through a scoping review of
relevant empirical, peer-reviewed and grey literature; a sense-making
workshop with program stakeholders; and content analysis of key SMI
documents. The study will use a multiple case-study design with embedded
units with contrasting cases. We define as a case the two primary care systems
of Honduras and El Salvador, each with different context characteristics. Data
will be collected through in-depth interviews with program actors and
stakeholders, documentary review, and non-participatory observation. Data
analysis will use inductive and deductive approaches to identify causal patterns
organized as ‘context, mechanism, outcome’ configurations. The findings will
be triangulated with existing secondary, qualitative and quantitative data
sources, and contrasted against relevant theoretical literature. The study will
end with a refined program theory. Findings will be published following the
guidelines generated by the Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Syntheses
study (RAMESES II). This study will be performed contemporaneously with
SMI’s mid-term stage of implementation. Of the methods described, the
preliminary program theory has been completed. Data collection, analysis and
synthesis remain to be completed.
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Introduction
Improving performance of primary care systems in low- and 
middle-income countries (LMICs) has been suggested as a neces-
sary condition for the achievement of universal health coverage in 
the age of the Sustainable Development Goals1. High-performing 
primary care systems not only are the first point of contact for 
continuous, coordinated, comprehensive and people-centered 
health services, but also provide critical preparedness and response 
to public health threats2,3.
The Salud Mesoamerica Initiative (SMI) is a multi-country, 
large-scale primary care performance improvement program. It is 
the result of a partnership between the governments of the eight 
Mesoamerican nation-states, the Bill and Melinda Gates Founda-
tion, the Carlos Slim Foundation, the Government of Canada, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and, during earlier 
stages, the Government of Spain. The program is aimed at improv-
ing reproductive, maternal, neonatal and child health outcomes 
among the poorest, rural populations in participating countries. 
Intended outcomes include increased availability, utilization, and 
effective coverage of primary care services and a reduction in 
preventable health inequities. The program’s approach to perform-
ance improvement combines the use of high-powered financial 
incentives at the government-level and the external verification of 
public sector, primary care system performance.
Programs and policies aimed at improving the performance of 
health systems have been at the forefront of many public-sector 
reforms. Initial waves of reforms in the public sectors of high-
income countries were focused on learning and improvement4–7; 
subsequent waves of reform targeted public sector account-
ability and organizational best-practice8,9. Governments in LMICs 
adopted and replicated these reforms, oftentimes with the 
support of multilateral finance institutions and agencies in the 
official development assistance space.
Several generic types of reforms follow the logic of public-sector 
interventions10, including (1) political interventions as expressed in 
policies and regulations; (2) reforms by laws; (3) intervention by 
audit and inspection, based on continuous evaluation of results and 
conformity to predefined norms; (4) intervention by manage-
ment, based on organizational science and management practice, 
such as continuous quality improvement or change management 
methods, among others; and, (5) intervention by rationalizing pro-
fessional behaviors such as the introduction of evidence-based 
practices and the standard comparison of outcomes by public 
sector providers.
In LMIC, accountability-driven reforms have flourished under 
the rubric of Results-based Financing (RBF); the health sector 
has regularly been at the center of such reforms. The Multilateral 
Finance Institutions, the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, tuber-
culosis and malaria, and the Global Alliance for Immunizations 
have financed results-oriented, global health programs, some 
of which have targeted health system improvements.
There are ambiguities in the definitions as well as in the scope 
and content of RBF programs and policies. In this study proto-
col, RBF is understood as “any program that rewards the delivery 
of one or more outputs or outcomes by one or more incentives, 
financial or otherwise, upon verification that the agreed-upon 
result has actually been delivered”11; incentives can target health 
care providers (supply side), households (demand side), or both. 
Performance-based Financing (PBF), is a prevalent type of RBF 
in which the incentives are exclusively financial; rewards are 
only aimed at providers; and the payments are usually adjusted 
for quality. PBF assumes many forms but, in essence, serves the 
purpose of reforming the ways in which governments pay health 
care providers (individuals and facilities) for the provision of 
services.
Accountability-driven interventions in public sector reforms 
are designed to reduce the misalignment in incentives between 
principals (voters, legislative bodies, executive-level leadership, 
funders, etc.) and their agents (program implementers, pro-
viders of care, etc.)12,13. Such reforms usually assume that 
incentives and rewards serve as powerful motivators for the 
achievement of desirable behaviors among utility-maximizing, 
rational individuals14–16. These assumptions have conventionally 
been based on principal-agent theory14,15, positive agency theory16, 
and/or rational choice theory17,18. In recent years, there have been 
calls for using a more expansive view of human agency when 
discussing motivation and decision-making. Under such views, 
humans are not exclusively motivated by rewards and incentives, 
but can also be driven to action by intrinsic motivators19. This 
perspective has also influenced contemporary research on PBF in 
LMIC20,21.
Most of the primary studies that have assessed RBF and PBF 
programs in LMIC have characterized the effects of financial 
incentives on provider-level motivation and behaviors21–31. 
However, the evidence on the effects of RBF on large-system 
reforms targeting government-level improvements is scarce; 
and studies in LMIC settings are largely absent32–34.
The most-recent systematic review of performance-based financ-
ing programs in LMIC concluded that PBF is not a single type 
of intervention and that its effects are dependent on the interac-
tions among multiple variables31. Most PBF evaluations to date 
have used a narrow focus such as characterizing changes in health 
care outputs, while neglecting most other domains of primary care 
performance improvement35. Furthermore, the empirical evidence 
about how PBF leads to changes in attitudes and behaviors among 
public sector actors is scarce35. Domains that have been under- 
studied include, among others, whether and how do extrinsic 
and/or intrinsic motivators affect the behaviors, autonomy and 
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responsiveness of providers and managers of primary care 
delivery systems; the influence that performance measurement 
data can have on the behaviors of primary care system actors and 
stakeholders; and the negative effects of RBF reforms, such as 
gaming, shirking and cream-skimming.
Public-sector reforms tend to incorporate multiple interventions 
that generate effects at different levels within organizational 
hierarchies, and among different actors and stakeholders. Those 
actors and the environments in which they are embedded interact 
with each other through time, generating inter-dependencies 
and, oftentimes, leading to counter-intuitive, emergent, and 
unintended effects. Furthermore, the implementation strategies 
and ancillary components of reform programs themselves, such 
as the provision of technical assistance or change management 
support, can also trigger system changes that need to be better 
studied31.
Beyond accountability reforms, studies on performance 
management and performance assessment have empirically stud-
ied improvement-driven public-sector reforms. Studies of such 
reforms in the public sector of the United States have identified 
factors that can drive organizational learning and improvement. 
For instance, Moynihan and Landuyt36 found that the most influ-
ential predictors of organizational improvement and learning were 
the use of work-groups as learning forums; the availability of 
performance information systems that collect, store and dissemi-
nate performance data; the existence of a mission orientation that 
builds a sense of shared vision for success and common purpose; 
and the existence of organizational slack, such as time and 
resources that allow people to think and learn.
Improvement reforms are predicated on the assumption that 
the continuous collection, availability and analysis of perform-
ance data and information would lead to organizational improve-
ment and learning7. However, despite widespread calls for using 
performance data and information to improve decision-making, 
the utilization of such data and information can rarely be 
guaranteed37. Also, little is known about the conditions under 
which performance measurement work or the mechanisms that 
lead to system improvement. Studies in evaluation science have 
addressed these issues38,39. In this literature, the availability and 
dissemination of performance evaluation can influence system 
improvement through multi-level changes on individual, inter-
personal and/or collective motivation. Considerable research in 
evaluation science has been informed by this evidence40–44. We did 
not find, however, any study assessing the effects of evaluation 
results on health system performance improvement in LMICs.
Study setting
In SMI, governments agree with the IADB to the implementation 
of up to three consecutive, 18–24 month programs, aimed at 
achieving a series of progressively complex health targets 
(including inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes) that are 
externally verified by the University of Washington’s Institute for 
Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). Participating governments 
contribute domestic funds a-priori to attain the agreed-upon 
targets; once domestic funds are made available and targets 
are agreed, SMI matches the domestic contribution with grant 
financing on a 1:1 ratio. Afterwards, the IADB enters into formal 
performance contracts with each government. In the contract, 
SMI commits to reimbursing half of the initially invested 
domestic funds contingent on the achievement of the agreed-upon 
performance targets45.
Country-specific performance frameworks with geographical 
targeting of the poorest, rural populations, were negotiated with 
each government at the start of the program and have remained 
stable through time. A pass-or-fail policy was agreed, accord-
ing to which a government has to achieve 80% or more of the 
approximately ten (10) targets that make-up any given per-
formance framework to be eligible for the reimbursement 
of half of the initial domestic contribution. Table 1 lists some of 
the targets agreed by El Salvador and Honduras.
As the agency in charge of external verification of government 
performance, IHME conducts a full-scale quantitative measure-
ment that follows SMI’s sequential process of implementation. 
Before each country program starts, a baseline is collected and 
its results disseminated. After that, at the end of each 18 to 
24-month implementation projects, IHME collects household 
and facility-based data to evaluate the achievement of agreed- 
upon results. Phase 1 programs started in a staggered fashion 
in 2011; phase-2 programs will finish during 2017; a third and 
final phase will start in 2018 and go into 2020. Program targets 
during phase 1 were focused on adherence to protocols, 
availability of resources and, in general, structure and process 
performance. During phase 2, targets were focused on outputs, 
and phase 3 will be centered on health outcomes, including but 
not limited to, coverage of exclusive breastfeeding, increased 
modern contraceptive prevalence rates, effective coverage of 
antenatal care and institutional deliveries, post-partum and post-
natal care coverage, and in some cases, reductions in the prevalence 
of anemia and effective coverage of measles vaccination, measured 
in blood46. After each round of performance evaluation, results 
are aggregated and disseminated in each country through policy 
dialogue workshops convened by the government and involving 
the IADB and IHME.
SMI’s original theory of change (Figure 1) hypothesized that the 
use of supply-side financial incentives directed to central-level 
ministries in each participating government (Ministries of Finance 
and Health) would focus their attention on accounting for the 
achievement of their own agreed-upon health targets. The success 
of this hypothesis rested on four causal pathways. The first estab-
lished that the three consecutive, biannual rounds of external 
verification of performance by IHME would generate sustained 
pressure on governments for the production of health results. The 
second pathway proposed that ongoing dialogic, participatory 
dissemination of data, information and evidence would lead to 
progressive improvements in the quality of care services and 
improved, aggregate performance in each participating country’s 
primary care system. Anticipated population-level health effects 
were also contingent on increasing domestic pro-poor health 
spending and expanding the demand for high impact health 
interventions among beneficiary populations.
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While the program’s original theory of change identified several 
causal pathways, it did not explain how its main interventions 
would trigger outcomes, nor did it provide, either, a-priori 
explanations about the role that each country’s policy context 
could play in moderating the effects of program interventions. 
The SMI partnership appears to have embraced a high degree of 
flexibility in implementation to facilitate governmental buy-in. In 
2011, the partners agreed on a set of common principles includ-
ing a focus on external and independent measurement of results, 
accountability and transparency, and country ownership. These 
principles established the institutional boundaries that, in turn, 
allowed the IADB to negotiate country-specific performance 
contracts, results frameworks and evaluation plans with each 
participating government. They also granted implementing part-
ners a high degree of flexibility in the design of each country’s 
multi-phased implementation plans and, also, led to performance 
contracts based on a few high-order principles (country owner-
ship, a focus on results, pro-equity, cost-effective interventions, 
measurability and transparency) that were originally agreed among 
the funders and the IADB, and reflected in the program’s operating 
model.
In the two countries under study, El Salvador and Honduras, the 
program’s focus on country ownership led to each government 
deciding how to best deploy SMI’s non-reimbursable resources 
and their own domestic financing to increase the likelihood of 
achieving programmatic success. For instance, El Salvador had 
undergone a health system reform in the early 2010s, which 
coincided with the beginning of SMI implementation. The 
government decided to focus its targets on results that leveraged 
one of the reform’s central tenets, the provision of universal 
primary care services through community-centered, Family 
Health Teams47. Honduras, in turn, had started in the late 2000s 
a large-scale pilot of contracting-out and pay-for-performance in 
the delivery of primary care services48. The government thus 
decided to leverage its own performance-driven policies and 
programs and has thus implemented SMI in municipalities that had 
already acquired experience with RBF.
Methods
Methodological approach
The evidence gaps identified in our literature review have led to 
recent calls for new approaches in the evaluation of complex 
public-sector reforms, such as PBF30,35,49,50. It has been argued 
that realist evaluation provides a valuable and relevant approach 
for assessing interventions that involve changing human deci-
sions and actions51,52. Realist evaluation is a form of theory- 
driven inquiry based on the premise an evaluation needs to answer 
“what worked, how, in what circumstances and for whom”, rather 
than the conventional question “Did the program work?”52. The 
appeal of this approach, compared to other theory-driven methods, 
lies in its explicit foundations in critical realism – an epistemol-
ogy located between positivism and relativism52. Such perspective 
contends that program interventions bring about social change 
through underlying, usually hidden causal mechanisms, and con-
siders the role of context as indispensable in explaining causality.
Figure 1. SMI initial theory of change.
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This study addresses two research questions: (1) What are the 
effects of using supply-side financial incentives on the performance 
of the primary care systems in Honduras and El Salvador? How 
are those effects produced? Under what contextual factors are these 
effects produced in each country? And, (2) What are the effects 
of continuous external verification of performance in the two 
countries under study? How are those effects produced? Under 
what contextual factors are these effects produced in each country?
While there is no single way to implement a realist evaluation 
study, as the experience with its use and applications grow, various 
authors have adopted and adapted Pawson and Tilley’s approach and 
identified a series of steps that are described below52–57.
Developing a preliminary program theory. Realist evaluation 
starts with the development of a program theory that serves as a 
hypothesis about the ways in which outcomes are produced through 
the interaction between interventions and context conditions, 
and mediated by hidden, not-observable mechanisms. The latter 
have been defined as the ideas and opportunities triggered 
among program actors and stakeholders in response to program 
interventions57. The process of testing and refining program 
theories usually relies upon quantitative and qualitative methods 
and culminates with a refined program theory53.
This stage in the study was completed through complementary 
approaches, including (1) review of program design documents; 
(2) discussions with program designers to gain in-depth 
understanding of the original causal links between program 
interventions and expected outcomes; (3) scoping review of the 
literature, focused on identifying theories and empirical evidence 
addressing similar processes of primary care system change; and, 
(4) facilitation of a workshop with IADB stakeholders, which 
helped understand their assumptions about how program inter-
ventions effects could be produced in the two countries under 
study. This process of making explicit the assumptions held by 
program stakeholders before data is collected is an essential 
aspect in realist evaluation. As a result of these various activities, 
the research team formulated a preliminary program theory.
In a separate, ongoing study we will perform a realist synthesis 
of performance improvement; performance measurement/ 
evaluation; and, results- and performance-based financing. The 
process started with a scoping review of social science theories 
related to the two research questions and led to the mapping and 
synthesis of theories explaining the contextual factors and causal 
mechanisms of relevance to this study protocol. This will be 
followed by a search for primary studies, systematic reviews, 
realist evaluations and realist syntheses on the themes above and 
as required by our research questions. The search for the scoping 
review was done on Science Direct, JSTOR, and Goodle Scholar 
using a snowballing technique. The theories that were mapped are 
summarized in Supplementary File 1.
Based on a synthesis of the results from the scoping review, 
and informed by the knowledge acquired from the stakeholder 
workshop and the document review, a preliminary program theory 
was developed (Figure 2). It is summarized below as a series of 
inter-linked propositions:
➢ The use of (1) high-powered, supply-side financial 
incentives aimed at central-level government actors and 
stakeholders (intervention 1) and the implementation 
of continuous, external evaluation and verification of 
Figure 2. Preliminary program theory.
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primary care service performance (intervention 2) sup-
ports country priorities through continuous policy dia-
logue, technical support, and purposive dissemination of 
performance results (implementation strategy);
➢   Leading to the adoption of innovations in supplies, infor-
mation, and workforce management (outcome 1); the 
adoption of performance management reforms such 
as continuous process and quality improvement (out-
come 2); the introduction of policies and regulations that 
promote primary care improvement and/or reductions 
in preventable inequities (outcome 3); and, improved, 
population-level health outputs and outcomes (outcome 4).
➢  The behavioral changes listed above occur at various levels 
within the primary care system, as follows;
o    At the individual level, they satisfy psychological needs 
such as autonomy, competence and relatedness and/or 
the need to upgrade or improve personal goals and 
self-efficacy (individual-level mechanisms)58–63;
o    At the interpersonal level, because of the aggregate 
internalization by multiple individual actors and stake-
holders, of changes in ideas and opportunities; and/
or through a growing sense of public service and/or 
community service (individual and interpersonal 
mechanisms)19,39.
o    Collective level changes could also be triggered 
whereby the ideas and opportunities of a sufficiently 
large number of individual actors internalize or 
assimilate new norms, routines and behaviors which, 
in turn, spread across inter-organizational and social 
networks64,65, leading to the emergence of new organi-
zational culture and collective behavior (outcome);
➢  Collective inter-organizational-level changes may further 
lead to the institutionalization and collective assimilation 
of aggregate individual- and interpersonal-level behaviors 
through imitation and/or the adoption of new professional 
and cultural norms, and/or innovative, pro-performance 
policies (outcome)33 thus, increasing the likelihood of the 
production of population-level health effects (outcome) 
and, potentially, transforming the primary care system in a 
sustained fashion (outcome)32,33.
Global, institutional, and organizational contextual conditions are 
also needed for the attainment of program outcomes and for the 
triggering of the above mechanisms. They include, at the global 
and sub-regional levels, the existence of favorable conditions such 
as influential issue-specific global agendas that match existing 
governmental priorities or a history of interactions between 
national health agencies and their agendas, and between those and 
official development aid agencies and their agendas66–69. At the 
country-level, the availability of solid institutional environments 
(laws, regulations, ongoing public-sector reforms, etc.) can create 
windows of opportunity for the introduction of policy innovations 
and, also, facilitate convergence between domestic policies and 
programs, and the externaly-funded interventions. Finally, pre- 
existing environmental conditions, such as the organizational 
capacity to absorve new knowledge or the presence of climates 
that support and enable change, have also been associated with 
increased assimilation of service innovations70,71 and need to be 
considered in the characterization of context.
Study design. In this step the preliminary program theory will be 
tested, further developed, and validated or rejected. A multiple 
case-study design with embedded units with contrasting cases 
was selected72. The contrasting case approach aligns well with the 
proposition that the two different country contexts in Honduras and 
El Salvador can trigger to-be-identified mechanisms that generate 
program results. Given the system-wide and reinforcing effects 
of the two interventions under study, we define each country’s 
primary care system as the unit of analysis. Within each coun-
try, at least two high-performing municipal-level primary care 
delivery systems will be analyzed as embedded sub-cases, each 
with its unique contextual and service delivery structure.
This evaluation is an 18-month study running from May 2017 to 
December 2018, and executed contemporaneously with SMI’s 
mid-term stage of implementation. The study seeks to maximize 
diversity in institutional and policy context to increase the likeli-
hood of identifying variations in policy and program conditions 
and characterizing the process of change generated to date by 
the program in one low- and one middle-income country, respec-
tively Honduras and El Salvador. Both countries have to date been 
exemplars of high-performance, which in SMI is defined as the 
continuous achievement of 80% or more of the targets agreed 
between each government and the IADB, and externally verified 
by IHME.
In each country, the study will assess the context, interventions, 
implementation approaches, and program effects, intended and 
otherwise. At the central level of government, the study will char-
acterize program antecedents, policy and organizational context, 
primary care system’s stewardship and policy-setting, and overall 
program management and implementation. At the local, munici-
pal level, it will explore primary care delivery through Family 
Health Teams in El Salvador, and on public as well as non-profit, 
pay-for-performance providers. Primary data collection will 
include the methods described below.
Data collection methods. Realist evaluation is method neutral, 
and the nature of the research, the evaluation questions and the 
preliminary program theory determine the choice of study design 
and methodology52,57. The primary data collection methods to be 
used in this study include in-depth interviews, non-participatory 
obervation, and document review.
In-depth interviews with key informants in each country will be 
conducted to identify individual, inter-personal and collective 
or organizational factors that may affect primary care system 
performance in each country under study. These interviews 
will also be used to elicit contextual elements that could act as 
barriers or facilitators for the delivery of SMI’s interventions. 
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In this study, we aim to gain a high-level understanding of the 
causal mechanisms and pathways of performance improvement, 
as reflected in the preliminary program theory. SMI intervenes 
at the central as well as local levels of the primary care system, 
generating hypothesized feedback effects between both. The 
evaluation aims require the characterization of the interactions 
and inter-dependencies that occur among multiple actors in the 
primary care system; this would allow resulting data to help 
explain the complex nature of the process of performance 
improvement, and ultimately, help the team validate or revise the 
preliminary program theory. Accordingly, in-depth key informant 
interviews will be conducted with four sets of actors: (1) Country 
policy- and program implementation actors in Honduras and 
El Salvador; (2) Health care providers at primary care facilities 
in Honduras and El Salvador; (3) Performance verification and 
evaluation stakeholders at IHME; and, (4) Program designers at 
the IADB. Key informants will be recruited using a purposeful 
sampling approach73. Subsequently, the sample will be snowballed 
from the initial set of informants.
The study’s sample size cannot be determined a-priori, but we 
expect to conduct approximately 80 key informant interviews, 
which will ultimately be determined based on theoretical 
saturation74. Respondents will be invited to participate voluntarily 
in the study; no compensation will be provided for participation. 
Interview guides will be used to conduct in-depth interviews; a 
series of probes will also be developed a-priori (Supplementary 
File 2). Interviews with country actors and stakeholders will be 
conducted in Spanish by bilingual members of the research team; 
IADB and IHME respondents will be interviewed in English. All 
interviews will be recorded and transcribed verbatim and, when 
applicable, professionally translated into English.
To document the process of policy dialogue, the study will use 
non-participant observation during the dissemination of the 
external verification of performance for the second phase of 
the program, in early 2018. The research team will document 
the process followed in the policy dialogue session, the agenda, 
components and intended objectives, the sequence of events that 
transpire following the results, and the reactions and actions 
by country actors and stakeholders. Summary memos of the 
observations will be generated to be maintained in the project files.
To further understand policy and program context, the study will 
review key program documents pertinent to the design, imple-
mentation and evaluation of SMI interventions in El Salvador and 
Honduras. Specific attention will be given to documenting the 
policy and program context in each country, identifying the 
implementation strategies in each country, assessing perform-
ance and evaluation frameworks, and identifying secondary data 
sources that could be used for further triangulation during the data 
analysis stage. A complete list of reviewed documents will be 
maintained, and included as a supplemental file with the final 
report of findings.
Data analysis
Data analysis of the in-depth key informant interviews will be 
conducted using an integrative methodology that merges both 
inductive and deductive approaches74. We will construct a set of 
a-priori codes drawing from the realist evaluation context, inter-
vention, mechanism, and outcome structure, relevant theoretical 
literature domains, the stakeholder workshop, and the document 
review described above. This will be combined with emergent 
inductive codes identified from a rigorous open coding process.
In an initial stage of data analysis, two coders will analyze a sub-
set of transcripts in an iterative and systematic manner using the 
constant comparison method, and afterwards finalize the codebook 
through negotiation75. Subsequent transcripts will be coded by three 
experienced coders using the final codebook.
The coded data will be appraised using two complementary ana-
lytic approaches. The research team will use iterative conceptual 
and pattern coding to identify major emergent inductive themes. 
At the conclusion of the process, the codes will be arranged into 
the four major categories of context, intervention, mechanism, and 
outcomes. The team will scan within each category, “vertically”, 
to identify commonalities and thematic elements, e.g. multiple 
combinations of contexts that could facilitate/inhibit the inter-
ventions; or a confluence of interventions that are catalytic and 
reinforce one another, etc. Furthermore, the data will be analyzed 
across categories, or “horizontally,” to identify causal patterns 
whereby certain outcomes are interrelated to program inter-
ventions that trigger mechanisms among primary care system 
actors under specific contextual conditions. We expect these two 
analytic approaches to be complementary, and to allow building 
context-mechanism- outcome (CMO) configurations that will 
then be gauged to determine which patterns plausibly explain how 
each intervention generated the observed effects, expected and 
otherwise. The final thematic structure will be used to refine the 
preliminary program theory. Data analysis will be done with nVivo 
Version 11 for Mac.
Evaluation results will be completed by integrating findings from 
the different data collection methods (interviews, notes from 
non-participatory observations, and secondary document analy-
sis) to confirm, reject or further develop the preliminary program 
thyeory and the causal patterns identified. The findings will also be 
contrasted with secondary quantitative and qualitative data sets 
collected by IHME and others and with social science literature in 
search for mechanism-oriented theory that may provide explana-
tion for the emerging causal patterns. The results will be a series of 
CMO configurations that are backed up by the empirical data that 
provide plausible causal explanations for the observed findings.
Synthesis and refined program theory. In this step the research 
team will link the emergent CMO configurations to the preliminary 
program theory, leading to the adoption, modification, or rejec-
tion of the preliminary program theory and will, then, formulate 
plausible explanations of how and why high-powered, supply side 
incentives and external verification of performance generate the 
observed results. The resulting explanations for the observed 
program effects will then be compiled in the form of narrative 
summaries, tables, and/or causal loop diagrams. The end of the 
study product is a final, refined program theory.
Study findings will be published in peer-reviewed periodicals and 
disseminated locally among policy-makers in the two countries to 
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be studied. The presentation of findings will be made following 
the Realist And Meta-narrative Evidence Syntheses study 
(RAMESES II) that was designed to provide guidance on qual-
ity assurance and uniform reporting and improve quality and 
consistency in the reporting of realist evaluations76,77.
Quality control
A set of measures will be taken to increase the validity of the study in 
terms of reflexivity, credibility and confirmability, and enhance the 
trustworthiness, transparency, and accountability of the research78. 
All researchers will engage in the introspective practice of main-
taining ‘personal biases memos’ to make explicit all self-identified 
biases and pre-conceptions that may effect the research process78. 
All analytic decision notes and memos, biases memos, document 
analysis syntheses, interview guides, research team meeting 
agendas and minutes, and analysis outputs including coded 
transcripts, conceptual frameworks, tables, etc. will be preserved 
to provide a verifiable audit trail.
Discussion
The refined program theory and CMO configurations resulting 
from this study have several anticipated uses and applications. Pro-
gram implementers like the IADB and Salvadorian and Honduran 
government actors, for instance, can use the findings to consider 
introducing adjustments in SMI’s implementation during its third 
and final phase (2018–2020). Also, given the study’s focus on 
exploring the linkages between ongoing, pre-existing policy 
mandates and priorities, it is plausible to expect study findings 
to be of relevance to further improve the evaluation and subse-
quent re-design of domestic health policies in El Salvador and 
Honduras. Program evaluators like IHME and other research 
groups, can use program findings to enhance ongoing evaluation 
activities or to inform the design of new evaluations that deepen 
one or more of the various casual patterns identified. For example, 
our research team intends to use the emerging CMO configurations 
in the area of performance management to inform the design of 
a new study to explore whether and how SMI quality improve-
ment interventions produce gains in primary care performance. 
We also expect program findings to set the stage for further realist 
evaluations in other large-scale primary care reform in contexts 
other than Mesoamerica.
Another source of complexity in this study arises from the 
significant evidence gaps that we identified and from the multiple 
fields that would need to be rigorously studied to properly address 
the various outcomes generated by accountability and perform-
ance management reforms. As discussed before, such outcomes 
can occur at different levels of analysis (individual, organizational 
and collective) and in different contexts (high- as well as LMIC). 
Not only does this type of research demand inter- and multi- 
disciplinary capabilities within research teams, but it also 
calls for rigorous, systematic assessment and mapping of the 
evidence gaps79,80. Theory-based program evaluations of pri-
mary care performance improvement would also benefit from the 
publication of realist syntheses that rigorously appraise the lit-
erature in search of context-mechanism-outcomes and program 
theory81,82. Such studies would not only facilitate the work of 
research teams currently addressing primary care performance 
improvement research, but would also strategically shape 
future health system research agendas, particularly in LMIC.
The research team has faced several challenges in shaping this 
study’s hypotheses, or preliminary program theory. Many of these 
challenges are common to other realist evaluations and have been 
discussed elsewhere53,83. One such challenge pertains to settling 
on an unambiguous and precise definition for what constitutes a 
mechanism. Several definitions in the literature are of a descrip-
tive nature and focus on well-known features of mechanisms such 
as them being unobservable, context-specific and being able to 
generate effects. We settled on a definition of mechanisms as 
the ideas and opportunities triggered among program actors and 
stakeholders in response to program interventions57. Such an 
approach is consistent with a view of social change according to 
which the beliefs, choices and opportunities of individual actors 
and the interactions among them (micro-level) are the main drivers 
of social change. This approach also recognizes that the “macro,” 
social and cultural environment in which these individual 
actors are embedded can shape social change by means of the 
internalization of collective values, norms and institutions among 
individual actors84,85.
Based on these considerations, this study aims to, first, explore 
plausible causal explanations based on individual or group-based 
ideas and opportunities among program actors and stakehold-
ers and, second, to ground those observations on an understand-
ing of the policy and program context in which those actors and 
stakeholders are embedded. Therefore, we expect that any expla-
nation of primary care system performance improvement needs to 
address both individual, micro-level, as well as collective, 
macro-level properties that “are not meaningfully attributed to 
individuals”84. Three specific types of mechanisms that explain 
social change are thus of interest to this study86.
Situational mechanisms refer to the macro, organizational-level 
environment in which SMI actors and their social interactions or 
linkages occur, including domestic policy-makers, ministry of 
health managers and primary care providers, among others. It also 
includes SMI stakeholders such as the implementation agency 
(the IADB) and the external evaluators of performance (IHME). 
This type of mechanism operates in the direction from macro envi-
ronment to individual actors (macro-to-micro change). Action- 
formation mechanisms are those that explain how actors’ ideas 
and opportunities influence individual behaviors across the primary 
care system. In this type of mechanism, the interaction between 
program interventions and context, trigger changes in individu-
als’ ideas and opportunities that further influence others in the 
same social system. This type of mechanism can generate effects 
that spread from an individual actor to additional actors (micro to 
micro change). Finally, transformational mechanisms provide 
explanations of how the sum of new behaviors of multiple indi-
vidual actors in the primary care system bring about change across 
the entities that conform the primary care system’s macro 
environment such as norms and institutions (micro-to-macro 
social change).
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Due to limitations in scope, this study can only plausibly 
characterize some of the “macro” and “micro” mechanisms trig-
gered during SMI’s initial stages up until its current, mid-term 
stage (2011–2017). It is also plausible to characterize intended and 
unintended effects generated during this same period. Findings 
can also be used identify propositions about downstream effects 
that could occur or not during the final implementation phase 
(2018–2020) and about the mechanisms that could help sustain 
desirable effects after implementation ends. Longer-term, 
transformational mechanisms, their anticipated effects and the 
underlying context-mechanism-outcome configurations will, 
however, remain outside our scope of work.
Another challenge in this study refers to the contested nature of the 
current definitions used to characterize the interventions that con-
form RBF, PBF or any of the various reforms that use supply-side 
incentives to drive accountability in public sector actors and, as is 
the case in SMI, across the entire primary care system. Like others 
before us, we settled on the definitions provided by Musgrove11, but 
we remain cognizant of the fact that PBF is not a single interven-
tion and that its “ancillary” components can themselves generate 
system effects31. In this respect, this study frames SMI interven-
tions as generic types of public-sector reforms aimed at inducing 
accountability and organizational improvement and learning. Given 
that the challenges in defining what these large-scale reforms 
contain in specific contexts –both in high and well as less-devel-
oped nations- the use of a realist evaluation approach will likely 
contribute to the theorizing of how and why specific contexts 
generate health and non-health effects in primary care performance 
management reforms.
Finally, given the method-neutrality that is central to realist 
evaluations, this study also faced the challenge of settling on a 
final sequence and content of research methods and activities. 
We decided to, first, follow the steps described by Vareilles and 
Marchal in relatively similar realist evaluations and studies53,57, 
but also relied on the Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Synthe-
ses study that provides guidance on how to improve quality and 
consistency in the reporting of realist evaluations77. By aligning 
protocol design to these guidelines, we expect that the furture 
publication of this study’s findings will adhere to current best 
practice.
Ethical statement
The study’s protocol was reviewed and declared exempt by the 
George Washington University’s Institutional Review Board (study 
number 041733). The Ministries of Health of El Salvador and 
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I recommend publication with minor revisions. 
As this is a study protocol as opposed to the actual study, there are no datasets at this time so the answer
to the question, "Are the datasets clearly presented in a useable and accessible format" can only be partly
or actually NA since the data will be collected using the study protocol that is proposed for publication and
eventually that will be carried out to assess the impact of SMI. 
Overall, I find this to be a thorough and carefully thought out study protocol that will provide important
insights into how the results produced by SMI were actually created.  As such, this study protocol will
shed important insights into how a large, complex intervention across multiple countries and over time
produced the quite astounding results that marked the success of SMI. Even as we have seen the
positive results from the regular evaluations and can easily see the quite significant improvements
countries that are part of this initiative have registered, important questions as to what factors actually
drove the impact seen remain only partially answered. This study will shed important light on these
questions.
I only have a few minor quibbles regarding the article.
The authors use PBF and RBF almost interchangeably and sometimes use both terms. I think it
might be less confusing to the reader to define terms up front and then use one term.
 
Page 3, paragraph 8, says that studies on the effects of RBF on large scale system reforms are
largely absent. Later on the authors cite a systematic review. In fact, there have been a number of
systematic reviews of RBF programs beyond the one cited. For example, Andy Oxman has several
papers that review (critically) the experience with RBF. Miller and Singer (2013) is another.
 
I also think that in the area of RBF, it's important to not focus only on LMIC experience as RBF is an
instrument that has been used and is being used extensively. The Quality and Outcomes
Framework (QOF) in the UK NHS is an example. Peter Smith has a number of papers that reviews
that experience and Cheryl Cashin and Peter Smith have a paper on how RBF links to the larger
issue of Strategic Purchasing.
 
Perhaps my strongest comment is on page 7, paragraph 6, regarding the program theory section. I
think it's quite possible to formulate a hypothesis that SMI was not primarily a classic extrinsic
financial incentive program but possibly much more an extrinsic non pecuniary program where the
rewards were doing well amongst your peers. When you look at the incentive rewards, its difficult
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4.  
financial incentive program but possibly much more an extrinsic non pecuniary program where the
rewards were doing well amongst your peers. When you look at the incentive rewards, its difficult
to see how such relatively small financial rewards could incent behavior. The counterpoint to this
argument might be that the funding provided by the SMI donors was flexible and in these heath
systems flexible funding is often rare and highly prized but that too is an issue deserving of further
investigation. However, if the funding is small and relatively insignificant, the question is then what
drove the behavior and actions taken. A factor worthy of investigation is the SMI approach of
engaging multiple countries in a form of joint competition. Ministers of Health were all engaged on
SMI and there is some anecdotal evidence that the approach of having them compete together,
each trying to attain the targets they set for their own country, created a form of competition or at
least a common forum where not performing well would be seen as a distinct negative outcome,
thereby conferring strong incentives for them to perform well or endeavor to make sure their health
system performs strongly. This kinds of peer effects are known to be powerful in behavioral
economics and so we should look for them in this study as well.  
Is the rationale for, and objectives of, the study clearly described?
Yes
Is the study design appropriate for the research question?
Yes
Are sufficient details of the methods provided to allow replication by others?
Yes
Are the datasets clearly presented in a useable and accessible format?
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 I was Deputy Director at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation during the timeCompeting Interests:
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years. I know and used to work with the lead author of this article when we were both employed by the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation.
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